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Public School Library Book Removals: Community
Values v. First Amendment Freedoms
Public criticism of library materials is increasing in the United
States today. Since the 1980 presidential election, criticism of public
library materials has increased 500%.t A recent survey of 7500 pub-
lic school administrators and librarians reveals that 20% of the na-
tion's public school districts and 30% of its school libraries have
experienced challenges to literary works.2 Proponents of censorship
in public school libraries argue that they are protecting traditional
American values by safeguarding impressionable students from ob-
jectionable materials; consequently, they pressure school boards to
remove such material. Opponents argue that censorship violates stu-
dents' first amendment rights;3 they look to the federal courts for the
protection of those rights.
In the past ten years plaintiffs have brought seven cases into fed-
eral courts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 4 alleging that school boards vio-
lated students' first amendment rights by improperly removing books
from public school libraries. 5 The main issue in these cases has been
whether a school board's removal of books from the school library
constitutes a prima facie first amendment violation.6 No two courts
1 Mann, Books and TV- New Targets of Reigtous Right, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT,
June 8, 1981, at 45.
2 Avon, The Crusade to Ban Books, SATURDAY REVIEW, June 1981, at 17.
3 NBC Nightly News, Special Segment, March 23, 1981 (transcript).
4 Section 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State of Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
5 Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981) (reversing grant of defendant's
motion for summary judgment and remanding for trial); Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High
School Bd. of Directors, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980) (affirming dismissal of complaint); Zykan
v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980) (vacating dismissal of
complaint and granting leave to amend); Minarcini v. Strongsville School Dist., 541 F.2d 577
(6th Cir. 1976)(reversing dismissal of complaint and rendering judgment for plaintiff); Presi-
dent's Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 998 (1972) (affirming dismissal of complaint); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F.
Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979) (judgment for plaintiffs); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School
Comm. of Chelsea, 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978) (judgment for plaintiffs).
6 A related question is whether a school board's non-selection of a book for the school
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have applied the same standard in resolving this issue, thus creating a
confusing and inconsistent body of law.
This note will suggest to courts an approach which balances the
firgt amendment rights of students against the authority of school
boards to protect students from objectionable material.
I. The Case Law
A. Sources of Students' First Amendment Right to Have Books Maintained
in Public School Libraries
The first amendment prohibits official restrictions on free
speech. Tinker v. Des Moines School District7 extended that protection
to high school students. When a school board removes a book from a
high school library, however, the board restricts the author's, and not
the student's speech. Thus, it appears that students would have no
standing to complain under the first amendment as long as the re-
moval does not restrict student expression. Indeed, in President's Coun-
cil, District 25 v. Community School Board No. 25,8 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to apply Tinker to a
public school library book removal case. The court stated that
"[t]here is here no problem of freedom of speech or the expression of
opinions on the part of parents, teachers, students, or librarians."9
Similarly, in Pico v. Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School
District,10 the two Second Circuit judges who found that library book
removals violated students' first amendment rights, based those find-
ings on the belief that the board's actions tended to suppress speech
or thought."
The Sixth Circuit, however, in Minarcini v. Strongsville School Dis-
trict,'2 identified two sources for the students' right to challenge li-
brary book removals other than the right of free speech. First, the
court labeled the school library a "mighty resource in the free mar-
library violates the first amendment. Courts have unanimously held that it does not. See Pico
v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d at 435-36 (Newman, J. concurring); Id. at 431-32 (Mansfield, J.
dissenting); Minarcini v. Strongsville School Dist., 541 F.2d at 584; President's Council, Dist.
25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d at 293; Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F.
Supp. at 1272-73; Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm. of Chelsea, 454 F. Supp.
at 711.
7 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
8 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
9 457 F.2d at 293.
10 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981).
11 Id. at 414-15 and 434-35.
12 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
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ketplace of ideas."' 3 Justice Holmes indicated the importance of this
marketplace concept when he wrote that "the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market."14 The Sixth Circuit court apparently felt that high school
students, as consumers in the marketplace, were entitled to make
their choices free from official censorship.
The second source, which the court in Minarcini found more per-
suasive, was the first amendment right to receive information. The
court emphasized that removing a book from a public school library
was a direct restraint, not on the students' speech, but on their right
to receive information. 15 The court relied particularly on Virginia
State Board of Pharmay v. Virginia Ciizens Consumer Council, in which
the Supreme Court overturned a Virginia statute that deemed phar-
macist advertising of drug prices unprofessional.' 6 The Sixth Circuit
adopted the Supreme Court's language which stated that "[i]f there
is a right to advertise there is a reciprocal right to receive advertis-
ing,' 7 and concluded that the first amendment clearly embodied the
right to receive information. Thus, the court held that the student
plaintiffs had standing to raise the first amendment issue.' 8
Although the Sixth Circuit in Minarcini treated the marketplace
concept and the right to receive information separately, the district
court in Right to Read Defense Committee v. School Committee of Chelsea 19
indicated that they are integrated doctrine. The district court
declared:
What is at stake here is the right to read and be exposed to contro-
13 Id. at 582.
14 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting).
15 541 F.2d at 583. The court points out that the right to receive information has been
recognized in many different contexts. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (right
of addressees to receive uncensored prisoners' mail); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753
(1972) (recognizing right of university officials to hear Marxist lecturer, but decided on other
grounds); Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (radio listeners' right to idea-
logically balanced broadcasts); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 577 (1969) (right to receive ob-
scenity in the home); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (addressees' right to
receive Communist publications in the mail); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (right
to receive handbills and pamphlets). See also Richmond Newspaper, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555 (1980); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S.
843 (1974). See general Emerson, Legal Foundations ofthe Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1;
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245; T. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970). The Supreme Court has never applied the
right to receive information to high school students.
16 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
17 541 F.2d at 583 (quoting 425 U.S. at 757).
18 541 F.2d at 583.
19 454 F. Supp 703 (D. Mass 1978).
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versial thoughts and language-a valuable right subject to first
amendment protection. As the [Supreme] Court commented in Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC [citation omitted], "It is the purpose of
the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail ....,20
If this right to read and be exposed to controversial thoughts and
ideas is the same as the first amendment right to receive information,
the district court in Right to Read would derive that first amendment
right from the marketplace concept. 21
In Salvail v. Nashua Board of Education,22 the New Hampshire dis-
trict court primarily applied the right to receive information to find
that students had a first amendment right to challenge library book
removals. 23 In discussing this right, the district court reasoned that
because a public school library contains both a communicative
source, the books, and a recipient, the students, the first amendment
protects the communications themselves.
24
The Seventh Circuit in Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp.25
severely limited the application of both the right to receive informa-
tion and the marketplace concept at the secondary school level.
While secondary students retained a "freedom to hear," two factors
limited the relevance of that freedom in secondary schools. First, the
level of intellectual development precludes the average high school
student from taking full advantage of the marketplace of ideas. Sec-
ond, secondary schools have a responsibility to teach fundamental
social, political and moral values that will permit their students to
take their place in the community.
26
Judge Mansfield, in his Pico dissent, approached the right to re-
ceive information differently, emphasizing that the right, as stated in
Virginia State Board of Pharmay, is reciprocal. He reasoned that, be-
cause no author could claim a constitutional right to have a school
library use his book, no student could claim the reciprocal right to
receive the information contained in school library books. Accord-
ingly, Judge Mansfield concluded that Virginia State Board of Pharmaq
did not apply to a school board's removal of books from public school
20 Id. at 714.
21 The integration of the marketplace concept and the right to receive information is
discussed more fully in the text accompanying notes 134-40 infla.
22 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979).
23 The court also briefly addressed the marketplace concept. Id. at 1275.
24 Id. at 1274.
25 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
26 Id. at 304.
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libraries.2 7
B. The Prima Fade First Amendment Violation
1. Standards for the Violation
The Second Circuit was the first to deal with book removals in
public school libraries. In President's Council, Distict 25 v. Community
School Board No. 2528 the defendant school board had voted to remove
Down These Mean Streets2 9 from all junior high school libraries in the
district. The board, however, later decided to return the book to
those libraries that had previously carried it, but to make it available
only on direct loan to parents. Students and others3 0 instituted a
Section 1983 action in federal district court, alleging that the school
board's action violated the first amendment. The district court dis-
missed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. The plaintiffs appealed.
In assessing the complaint's adequacy, the Second Circuit relied
heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Epperson v. Arkansas.
3 1
The Court in Epperson stated that public education should be locally
controlled and that courts should not intervene in the daily operation
of school systems unless basic constitutional values are directly and
sharply implicated.3 2 The Second Circuit then opined that because
there was no showing of a curtailment of freedom of speech or
thought, the school board's action did not directly and sharply impli-
cate first amendment values; thus, the court ruled that plaintiffs
failed to establish a prima facie case.
33
According to the court, several factors illustrated that the
board's action did not curtail first amendment freedoms. First, the
board's stated reason for the removal was that the book's obscenities
and explicit sexual interludes would adversely affect the students,
both psychologically and morally. Second, President's Council, unlike
Epperson, presented no religious establishment or free exercise ques-
tions.3 4 Teachers in class were free to discuss problems which the
27 638 F.2d at 429.
28 457 F.2d 289.
29 Written by Piri Thomas.
30 The other plaintiffs were past presidents of various parent-teacher associations, par-
ents, teachers, a librarian and a school principal.
31 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
32 457 F.2d at 291 (quoting 393 U.S. at 104).
33 457 F.2d at 293.
34 In Epperson, the Court found that an Arkansas statute criminalizing the teaching of
evolution violated the free exercise and establishment clauses of the first amendment.
[October 1981]
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book addressed, the board's action could not be construed as a ban
on the teaching of any theory or doctrine. Fourth, parents could still
borrow the book from the school library for their children.35 Thus,
the court found the Board's intrusion upon first amendment rights to
be "not only not 'sharp or direct,'" but "miniscule. ' 36
The court's language, however, invites subsequent courts to find
a prima facie first amendment violation for book removals. In Presi-
dent's Council, if the board's reasons for removing the book had been
less related to the students' well-being, or there had been a ban on
the teaching of some theory or .doctrine, or if the board had totally
removed the book from the library, then the court's language implies
that it may have found sufficient curtailment of freedom of speech or
thought to constitute a first amendment violation. Subsequent
courts accepted-the Second Circuit's invitation.3
7
The Sixth Circuit faced a similar book removal situation in
Minarcini v. Strongsville Board of Education .31 The Strongsville Board of
Education, without explanation, voted to disapprove the purchase of
Catch-2239 and God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater4° as high school text or
library books and to remove Catch-22 and Cat's Cradle4 from the
school library. Five high school students sued under Section 1983,
alleging that the board's actions violated their first and fourteenth
amendment rights. The federal district court dismissed the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim, and the plaintiffs appealed.
The Sixth Circuit not only reversed the lower court, but also
ordered the board to return Cat's Cradle and Catch-22 to the library
shelves. 42 The court first focused on the absence of any explanation
for the removal that was neutral in first amendment terms.43 From
this absence, the court concluded that the board removed the books
because it believed it had an absolute power to censor school library
35 457 F.2d at 292.
36 Id.
37 See generally text accompanying notes 56-59 infra.
38 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
39 Written by Joseph Heller.
40 Written by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.
41 Written by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.
42 The court validated the board's failure to approve the purchase of CATCH-22 and
GOD BLESS YOU, MR. ROSEWATER. See text accompanying notes 55-59 infra for a discussion
of the distinction between removal and non-selection.
43 541 F.2d at 582. The court failed to specify what kind of explanation would be neu-
tral in first amendment terms.
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materials that board members found distasteful.44 The court then
held that, although neither the State of Ohio nor the school board
was under any compulsion to create a public school library, once
having created one "neither body could place conditions on [its] use
• . .which were related solely to the social or political tastes of school
board members. '45 Thus, under Minarcini, a prima facie first amend-
ment violation occurs when a school board removes a book solely
because it conflicts with the social or political views of individual
board members. The court will presume such a motive for the
board's action when the board fails to provide an explanation that is
neutral in first amendment terms.
In Right to Read Defense Committee v. School Committee of Chelsea
46
and Salvail v. Nashua Board of Education ,'47 two First Circuit district
courts applied the Minarcdni standard. In Rikht to Read, a student's
parent complained to the school committee chairman about the lan-
guage of a poem in an anthology of writings by teenagers, titled Male
and Female Under 18. The committee circulated a copy of the poem
among its three male members, 48 who characterized the poem's lan-
guage as lewd, obscene, obnoxious and filthy.49 The committee then
unanimously resolved to remove the anthology from the school li-
brary.50 Students and others5t brought a Section 1983 action seeking
a return of the anthology to the school library.
Similarly, in Salvail, a board member objected to the public high
school's subscription to Ms. magazine, charging that the magazine
contained various offensive advertisements.52 At a public meeting,
44 Id.
45 Id. In a later case interpreting Minardni a district court stated, "[i]t is a familiar consti-
tutional principle that a state, though having acted when not compelled, may consequently
create a constitutionally protected interest." Right to Read, 454 F. Supp. at 712. If this inter-
pretation is correct, then removal based on the social or political tastes of board members
must violate a constitutionally protected interest. As the text accompanying notes 15-18,
supra indicates, that interest is the first amendment right to receive information.
46 454 F. Supp. 703.
47 469 F. Supp. 1269.
48 The three female committee members were not given a copy because of the poem's
"crude" and "offensive" language. 454 F. Supp. at 707.
49 Id. At trial the defendants did not contend that the poem was obscene. Id. at 711.
50 After commencement of this litigation and under the advice of counsel, the committee
passed a resolution reaffirming the removal of the anthology because the poem dealt with sex
education, had an unhealthy and counterproductive effect on school children, and used words
considered filthy and shocking by a large segment of the community. Id. at 709.
51 The others included parents, teachers, the Right to Defense Committee and the Mas-
sachusetts Library Association. Parents and the Massachusetts Library Association were dis-
missed for lack of standing. Id. at 705 n. 2.
52 The offensive advertisements were for vibrators, contraceptives, materials dealing with
[October 19811
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the board voted to cancel the library's Ms. subscription and to re-
move all back issues from the shelves. 53 Students, taxpayers and
teachers brought a Section 1983 action seeking an order that the
board return the magazine to the library.
Both the Right to Read and the Salvail opinions applied the
Minarcini standard, stating that the school boards could not condi-
tion use of library materials upon compliance with the social or polit-
ical tastes of individual board members.54 Because the board's
personal distaste was the primary motivation for the removals, both
courts ordered the school boards to return the banned materials to
the school libraries.
55
President's Council, Minarcini, Right to Read and Salvail present a
consistent and coherent body of law concerning the removal of books
from public school libraries. Although the result in President's Council
differed from the results in the latter three cases, the courts' analyti-
cal approaches were similar. Eperson stated that only actions which
directly and sharply implicated constitutional values warranted judi-
cial intervention. 56 The Second Circuit in President's Council indi-
cated that only library book removals which curtailed free speech or
thought directly and sharply implicated constitutional values.5 7 The
Sixth Circuit in Minarcini extended the Epperson standard by reason-
ing that removal of library materials, based solely on the social or
political tastes of individual board members, also directly and
sharply implicated a constitutional value, the first amendment right
to receive information.5 8 The district courts in Right to Read and Sal-
vail almost mechanically applied the Minarcini standard to find first
amendment violations.
59
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Zykan v. Warsaw Community
School Corp.,60 however, introduced inconsistency and confusion to
the law concerning book removals. In Zykan, the school board
removed Go Ask Alice61 from the school library.62 The plaintiff, a
lesbianism and witchcraft, pro-communist folk singers and newspapers, and vacations to
Cuba. 469 F. Supp. at 1272.
53 After commencement of this litigation the board voted to return two back issues of
Ms. to the shelves after excising the offensive advertisements. Id. at 1273.
54 454 F. Supp. at 713; 469 F. Supp. at 1272.
55 454 F. Supp. at 715; 469 F. Supp. at 1274.
56 393 U.S. at 104.
57 457 F.2d at 293.
58 541 F.2d at 582-83.
59 454 F. Supp. at 712-13; 469 F. Supp. at 1274.
60 631 F.2d 1300.
61 Anonymously authored.
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high school student, brought a Section 1983 action, alleging that the
school board banned the book because it offended the "social, polit-
ical and moral tastes' 63 of the board members and, thus, violated her
first and fourteenth amendment rights.64 The district court, in dis-
missing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, stated
that "[t]o allege that school officials have made decisions regarding
. . .library books. . . solely on the basis of personal 'social, political
and moral' beliefs is insufficient to allege a violation of constitution-
ally protected 'academic freedom.' "65
Upon appeal, the Seventh Circuit chose not to apply the
Minarcini standard, which would have required a reversal of the dis-
trict court. Instead, the court relied on Cag v. Board of Education66 and
held that "it is in general permissible and appropriate for local
boards to make decisions based upon their personal social, political
and moral views."67 Thus, the court in Zykan affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the complaint. The Seventh Circuit's standard is
that a plaintiff can only establish a prima facie case by alleging "that
the removal was part of an action to cleanse the library of materials
conflicting with the School Board's orthodoxy," 68 or that the removal
was part of a "purge of all materials offensive to a single, exclusive
perception of the way of the world. '69 Bare allegations that the re-
moval was based on the personal social, political and moral beliefs,
sufficient under the Minarcini standard, do not meet the more restric-
tive Zykan test. 7
0
The Second Circuit's decisions in Pico v. Board of Education, 7 and
62 631 F.2d at 1302. The board also ordered the removal and destruction of one text-
book, forbad the use of three others, eliminated seven courses from the curriculum and re-
fused to rehire two English teachers. Id. The scope of this note is limited to removal of books
from high school libraries. Most of the Zkan decision deals with the academic freedom issues
raised by the board's banning textbooks and discontinuing courses. Those portions of the
decision are addressed here only insofar as the court relates them to the removal of Go ASK
ALICE from the school library.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1303.
66 598 F.2d 535, 544 (10th Cir. 1979). Cag involved an action by teachers to enjoin a
school board from prohibiting the use of various textbooks. One of this note's purposes is to
demonstrate that the court's reliance on Cag was misplaced as applying to removal of library
books. See text accompanying notes 142-45 infra.
67 631 F.2d at 1305.
68 Id. at 1308.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 638 F.2d 404.
[October 19811
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Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Board of Directors72 add further
inconsistency and confusion to the law governing book removals
from public school libraries. In Pico, board of education members
attended an educational conference where they obtained lists of of-
fensive books and excerpts of the more objectionable material.
73
About two months later, the board members found eleven of the ob-
jectionable books in the library.74 The board ordered the removal of
all the books. The district superintendent protested any removal
based on someone else's list and requested that the board follow dis-
trict procedures for such a situation and avoid creating a public fu-
ror. The board merely repeated the directive for removal of all the
books and issued a press release stating that the books were "offensive
to Christians, Jews, Blacks, and Americans in general" and contained
"obscenities, blasphemies, brutality and perversion beyond descrip-
tion."' 75 Although a board-appointed committee read the books and
recommended the return of six of them, the board voted to return
only two of the books to the library. High school students sued, al-
leging first amendment violations and seeking injunctive and declar-
atory relief. The district court, relying principally on the Second
Circuit's decision in President's Council, granted the defendant's sum-
mary judgment motion.
In Bicknell, a companion case to Pico, two parents complained to
the school board about vulgar and indecent language in Dog Day Af-
ternoon76 and The Wanderers.77 Although it had adopted a procedure
for the selection and removal of library books, the board voted imme-
diately to remove The Wanderers from the library and place Dog Day
Afternoon on a restricted shelf.78 Students and others79 sued to enjoin
the book removals. They claimed that the board's action violated
their first amendment rights because the action was motivated solely
72 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980).
73 638 F.2d at 407.
74 The books at issue are: THE FIXER by Bernard Malamud; SLAUGHTERHOUSE FIVE by
Kurt Vonnegutt, Jr.; THE NAKED APE by Desmond Morris; DOWN THESE MEAN STREETS
by Piri Thomas; BEST SHORT STORIES BY NEGRO WRITERS edited by Langston Hughes; Go
ASK ALICE by an anonymous author; A HERO AIN'T NOTHING BUT A SANDWICH by Alice
Childress; BLACK Boy by Richard Wright; LAUGHING Boy by Oliver LaFarge; SOUL ON ICE
by Eldridge Cleaver; and A READER FOR WRITERS edited by Jerome Archer. Id.
75 Id. at 410. The press release also attributed opposition to the book removal to union
leaders who sought to use the issue to gain board seats in an upcoming election. Id.
76 Written by Patrick Mann.
77 Written by Richard Price.
78 638 F.2d at 440.
79 These were parents, library employees and the Right to Read Defense Fund.
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by the board member's "personal tastes and values."8 0 The district
court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.
The Second Circuit, in Pico, voted to reverse the grant of sum-
mary judgment and to remand for trial."' Each of the three judges
filed a separate opinion and applied a different standard. The judges
then applied the standards developed in Pico to the facts in Bicknell
and voted to affirm the district court's dismissal of the complaint.
8 2
In determining whether a prima facie first amendment violation
existed, the decisions before Pico focused on the substantive reasons
for a book's removal. Judge Sifton's opinion in Pico departed from
this approach by focusing on the school board's procedures for re-
moving the book as well as the substantive reasons for the removal.
In emphasizing the book removal procedures, Judge Sifton stated:
What we have. . . is an unusual and irregular intervention in the
school libraries' operations by persons not routinely concerned with
their contents. . . under circumstances, including the explanations
for their actions given by the participants, which so far from clarify-
ing the scope and intentions behind the official action, create in-
stead grave consequences concerning both subjects. In
circumstances of such irregularity and ambiguity, aprimafacie case
is made out. . . because of the. . . real threat that the school offi-
cials' irregular and ambiguous handling of the issue will. . . serve
to suppress freedom of expression.
8 3
In discussing the substantive reasons for the book removals, Judge
Sifton indicated that mere reference to the board members' "per-
sonal standards of taste or political philosophy"8 4 as one factor in a
book removal decision would not constitute a prima facie first
amendment violation.8 5 He then opined that when boards remove
books applying board member's personal beliefs and using proce-
dures which "suggest an unwillingness on [their] part to subject their
political and personal judgments to the same sort of scrutiny as that
accorded other decisions relating to the education of their charges," a
80 638 F.2d at 441.
81 One judge dissented from this result. No majority opinion was reached, however, as
the two judges who voted to reverse relied on different reasoning.
82 One judge dissented from this result as well. No majority opinion was reached in this
case because the two judges voting to affirm relied on different reasoning.
83 638 F.2d at 414-15.




prima facie first amendment violation occurs.86
Judge Newman, joining the majority in both Pico and Bicknell,
recognized that school officials have broad discretion to chart the
course of the educational process in public schools.8 7 He reasoned,
however, that use of this discretion to suppress ideas threatened first
amendment values only when the suppression was sufficiently spe-
cific and serious.88 Thus, although disapproval of ideas would not
necessarily violate the Constitution, "clearly defined and carefully
planned action to suppress an idea," such as removing a book from a
school library because of the book's contents, may violate the first
amendment.89 Judge Newman offered a specific two-step test for de-
termining the existence of a prima facie first amendment violation.
First, the court should focus on whether the board's action poses a
sufficient threat to the suppression of ideas, and not on whether ideas
are, in fact, suppressed. Second, the threat of suppression becomes
constitutionally impermissible when the board's actions are politi-
cally motivated. 90 Judge Newman later added that when a case
presents both permissible and impermissible motives for removing a
book, the court should rule on the basis of the impermissible
motives.91
In applying his "political motivation" standard to the facts in
Pico, Judge Newman first emphasized that the board singled out the
removed books for official disapproval.92 He then pointed to specific
board objections to the books, noting their political overtones, 93 and
concluded that the Pico facts required a trial to determine whether
86 Id. This note discusses the book removal procedures which Judge Sifton found to be
impermissible. See text accompanying notes 115-16 and 120-21 infra.
87 638 F.2d at 432.
88 Id. at 434.
89 Id.
90 Id. Judge Newman defines a politically motivated exclusion as one "motivated by the
author's opinion about the proper way to organize and run society." Id.
91 Id. at 437-38. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Newman addressed the case of Mt.
Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). That case held that an
untenured teacher may be dismissed for a legitimate reason related to teaching performance,
even if an impermissible reason such as expression of protected speech also affected the dis-
missal. He reasoned that the Mt. Healthy decision, designed to avoid placing the teacher in a
better position for exercising a constitutional right than he would have occupied had he done
nothing, had no application to library book removals. Id.
92 Id. at 436.
93 The board first objected to A READER FOR WRITERS because it contained an essay
equating Malcolm X with our founding fathers. The board condemned SOUL ON ICE be-
cause of its anti-American material and hate for white women. The board labelled A HERO
AIN'T NOTHING BUT A SANDWICH as anti-American because it pointed out the irony of
George Washington's status as a slave owner. Id.
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the board's actions created a sufficient risk of suppressing ideas in
violation of the first amendment.94 In Bicknell, however, Judge New-
man voted to affirm the dismissal of the complaint. The plaintiffs'
failure to allege that the board's actions were content-based or politi-
cally motivated was, in his view, fatal. He emphasized that "it is no
cause for legal complaint that the board members applied their own
standards of taste about vulgarity.
'95
Judge Mansfield, dissenting in Pico and joining the majority in
Bicknell, urged a rigid application of the Epperson standard, which
permits court intervention only when board decisions "directly and
sharply implicate basic constitutional values."' 96 He reasoned that a
school board fails this standard only when its actions violate the stu-
dents' right of expression and are not reasonably and necessarily re-
lated to the school board's performance of its educational functions. 97
Judge Mansfield pointed out that the Second Circuit, in James v.
Board of Education, S ruled that the transmission of community values
is a proper function of elementary and secondary education.99 Judge
Mansfield, thus:
(1) urged adoption of the Seventh Circuit's approval in Zkan of
book removals based on the "personal social political and moral
views" of board members;1°°
(2) found it constitutionally permissible for a school board to im-
plement its conservative educational philosophy;101 and
(3) indicated that those who disagreed should resort to the election
process. 1
0 2
Furthermore, he reasoned that because the board's actions did not
suppress the free exchange of ideas, prohibit class discussion of the
books, or limit the students' access to the books from other sources,
this case was indistinguishable from the Second Circuit's ruling in
94 Id. at 438.
95 Id. at 441.
96 Id. at 425 (quoting Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104).
97 Id. at 425.
98 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1972) (dealing with the discharge of a teacher for wearing a
black armband to protest the Vietnam war).
99 638 F.2d at 426.
100 Id. (quoting Zykan, 631 F.2d at 1305).
101 638 F.2d at 431.
102 Id. The Second Circuit in James, on the other hand, said "[t]he dangers of unre-
strained discretion are readily apparent. Under the guise of beneficient concern for the wel-
fare of school children, school authorities. . . might permit the prejudices of the community
to prevail. . . . [I]n such a situation. . . the will of the transient majority can prove devas-
tating to freedom of expression." 461 F.2d at 575. Accord, West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
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President's Council. 03 He, therefore, concluded that the board's ac-
tions were constitutionally permissible.104
2. Valid Defenses
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie first amendment vio-
lation, the burden shifts to the defendant to assert any available de-
fenses. Only the Sixth Circuit in Minarcini, the Second Circuit in
Pico, and the Massachusetts district court in Right to Read have sub-
stantially addressed the question of valid defenses. In Alinarcni, the
Sixth Circuit found a prima facie first amendment violation because
the school board failed to explain its actions in terms neutral under
the first amendment. 0 5 In addition to failing to give guidance as to
what "neutral in first amendment terms" entails, the court also did
not indicate whether, in the absence of a neutral explanation, the
school board could otherwise show a constitutionally permissible mo-
tive for the book removal.
The Massachusetts district court in Right to Read attempted to
rectifyMinarcini's failures by looking to Tinker v. Des Moines School Dis-
1r1it °0 6 for a statement of valid defenses. The court stated that
"[w]hen First Amendment values are implicated, the local officials
removing the book must demonstrate some substantial and legiti-
mate government interest. Tinker . .. stand[s] for the proposition
that an interest comparable to school discipline must be at stake."'
10 7
In his extensive discussion of valid defenses in Pico, Judge Sifton
formulated a two-part test that the defendant must pass in order to
prevail. First, to show that a reasonable basis for the book removal
exists, the defendant must prove, by reasonable inferences flowing
from concrete facts, that the banned materials materially and sub-
stantially jeopardized the interests of discipline or sound educa-
tion.10 8 Examples of reasonable bases include protection of the
103 638 F.2d at 426.
104 Id. at 427.
105 See note 43 supra.
106 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, high school students were suspended for wearing black
armbands to protest the war in Vietnam. The Court ruled that only upon a showing by the
defendant school board that the armbands interfered with school discipline could the suspen-
sions be upheld. Id. at 513.
107 454 F. Supp. at 713. E.g., Salvail, 469 F. Supp. at 1275. The Right to Read court found
that the defendants failed to assert a valid defense because the plaintiffs proved that the poem
in question would have no harmful effects on students. Although the poem's language was
offensive to some parents, this was not dispositive in light of Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359,
361-62 (Ist Cir. 1969), which stated that "[parental] sensibilities are not the full measure of
what is proper education."
108 638 F.2d at 415 (citing James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d at 571).
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psychological well-being of the young 09 and promoting standards of
civility and decency among students. 110 Second, the defendant must
show that the school board's action is as narrowly drawn as is neces-
sary to justify the societal interests involved. This second prong in-
cludes both the substantive criteria by which the board decides to
remove books and the procedures by which it accomplishes the re-
moval. 11 Judge Sifton urged that specificity by the school board was
necessary to insure against any chilling of protected expression that
could accompany a more broadly drafted regulation.,
1 2
In concluding that the Pico defendants failed to establish a valid
defense, Judge Sifton focused primarily on the second of his two
prongs. Concerning the substantive issue, he stated that complaints
of anti-Christian and anti-American content were too general and
failed to provide the kind of guidance necessary to insure free and
open debate.' 13  In considering the board's removal procedures,
Judge Sifton wrote that "the defendants are hardly in a position to
carry their burden of establishing that they have not 'unduly re-
stricted speech to an extent greater than is essential' to the further-
ance of the interest sought to be protected."'1 4 In so holding, Judge
Sifton focused specifically on the board's removing books without
reading them, 15 drawing the book removal issue into a board elec-
tion and labor dispute and creating the impression that freedom of
expression would be determined by the majority's will.'
1 6
3. Overcoming a Valid Defense
A defendant school board should prevail if it alleges and proves
a valid defense. However, some courts have afforded plaintiffs the
opportunity to show that a purportedly valid defense was actually
109 638 F.2d at 415 (citing Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 1977), cerl.
denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978)).
110 638 F.2d at 415 (citing Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980) (Newman, J., concurring)).
111 638 F.2d at 415 (citing Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 806 (2d Cir.
1971)).
112 638 F.2d at 416 (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1967)).
113 638 F.2d at 416.
114 Id. (quoting Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d at 806).
115 In Pico the board based its decision to remove on mimeographed quotations prepared
by anonymous editors. 638 F.2d at 409.
116 The board surveyed 4,979 households in the district to determine whether they sup-
ported the board's actions. Id. at 411-12. It should also be noted that these procedures also
constitute the unusual and irregular intervention by the board which Judge Sifton reasoned




the pretext for an unconstitutionally motivated book removal. A pri-
mary example is Right to Read. There the district court found that
the school board removed the offensive anthology because individual
board members disapproved of a certain poem's language and
theme. After the plaintiff's filed their Section 1983 action, the board,
under the advice of counsel, passed a resolution stating that it was
removing the book for reasons more specifically related to the educa-
tion and well-being of the students. 1 7 The court held the resolution
to be a pretext designed merely to meet the issues of the litigation.'"8
Similarly, the defendant school board in Salvail voted, after the
plaintiffs sued, to return two back issues of Ms. magazine to the li-
brary. The district court in Salvail also found the board's action to be
a self-serving pretext." 9
Judge Sifton, in Pico, urged that courts should always give plain-
tiffs an opportunity to show that the purported justifications for a
book removal are mere pretexts for the suppression of speech. 120 The
judge emphasized a number of factors which warranted an inference
that the student's welfare was not the true motivation for the book
removals.' 21 First, the board's reasons for removing the books were
confusing and incoherent. Second, the board proceeded in an infor-
mal and dilatory manner. Third, after it removed the books, the
board appointed a committee to review them and without explana-
tion, ignored the committee's recommendations. Fourth, profes-
sional personnel, including the district superintendent, strongly
opposed the board's tactics. Finally, the board removed the works of
renowned authors, including Jonathan Swift, Richard Wright and
Bernard Malamud. 122 Thus, Judge Sifton concluded that even if the
board asserted valid defenses, the plaintiffs were entitled to prove
that those defenses were merely pretexts for the suppression of
speech. 123
117 Set note 50 supra.
118 454 F. Supp. at 712.
119 469 F. Supp. at 1275.
120 638 F.2d at 417-18.
121 These factors also comprise the unusual and irregular intervention which was an ele-
ment ofJudge Sifton's prima facie first amendment violation. See text accompanying note 83
7upra.
122 638 F.2d at 417-18.
123 Id. at 418.
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II. A Suggested Approach
A. Source of the Students' Right
Although the Supreme Court has not held that the right to re-
ceive information applies in public high schools, the Court has held
that the high school is a marketplace of ideas. 24 The marketplace
concept is a source of the right to receive information. 25 Thus, the
right to receive information must exist in public high schools.
The Supreme Court initially applied the marketplace concept to
schools at the university level.1 26 In Tinker v. Des Moines School Dis-
trice,127 the Court extended the marketplace concept to public high
schools. Overturning the suspension of three students for wearing
black armbands to protest the Vietnam War, the Court emphasized
that students could not be confined to expressing officially approved
sentiments and receiving officially approved communications. 28
Rather, the Court ruled that "[t]he classroom is peculiarly the 'mar-
ketplace of ideas.' 129
Despite the ruling in Tinker, commentators still dispute the ap-
plicability of the marketplace concept to public high schools.' 30 Pro-
fessor Stephen R. Goldstein reasons that education can be divided
into two models: the prescriptive, in which teachers furnish accepted
truths to a theoretically passive, absorbent student, and the analytic,
in which students and teachers actively participate in the search for
truth through an examination of data and values.' 3' He asserts that
the high school classroom serves a prescriptive function that is incon-
sistent with the marketplace concept.
Another commentator, however, argues that while the function
of the high school classroom is prescriptive, the function of the li-
124 Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
125 See text accompanying notes 134-40 infra.
126 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1966). The Court overturned a
New York statute requiring college professors to take loyalty oaths, stating that "[t]he class-
room is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas." Accord, Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972)
(applying marketplace concept to college classroom and its environs.).
127 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
128 Id. at 511.
129 Id. at 512 (quoting K.7ishian, 385 U.S. at 603).
130 Compare Nahmod, Controversy in the Classroom: The High School Teacher and Freedom of
Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1032 (1977) (advocating a first amendment theory of
education which makes students participants in the marketplace of ideas) with Goldstein, The
Asserted Right of Public School Teachers to Determine What Th Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1293
(1976) (arguing that the marketplace concept is inconsistent with the functions of high school
education).




brary is analytic. 32 Compulsory attendance and uniform curricu-
lum requirements evidence the prescriptive nature of the high school
classroom. On the other hand, students are not compelled to use the
high school library. The library generally contains works outside the
standard curriculum requirements and allows students to pursue
their own interests. Thus, the statement in Minarcini that "the library
is a mighty resource in the marketplace of ideas"' 33 is especially
cogent.
Equally cogent is the proposition that the right to receive infor-
mation derives from the marketplace concept. 134 Justice Brennan's
statement that "[i]t would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had
only sellers and no buyers"' 35 illustrates the logic of the derivation.
The purpose of the marketplace concept is to preserve "that robust
exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of
tongues."' 36 The Supreme Court has stated similar goals as the pur-
pose of the right to receive information. For instance, in Martin v. Cio
of Struthers'3 7 the Court reasoned:
The authors of the First Amendment knew that novel and uncon-
ventional ideas might disturb the complacent, but they chose to
encourage a freedom which they believed essential if vigorous en-
lightenment was to triumph over slothful ignorance. This freedom
embraces the right to distribute literature [citations omitted] and
necessarily protects the right to receive it. 133
And in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,19 the Court emphasized that
the rights of radio listeners mandated that stations function consist-
ently with the purposes of the first amendment and declared that one
of those purposes was preservation of an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas. 40 These decisions indicate that the right to receive informa-
tion springs from the marketplace concept.
B. The Prima Fade First Amendment Violation
The next analytical step is to determine to what extent the mar-
132 Note, The Right to Know and School Board Censorship of Book Acquisitions, 34 WASH. & LEE
L. RE v. 1116, 1122 (1977).
133 541 F.2d at 583.
134 See Note, supra note 132, at 1130.
135 Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
136 Kqishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
137 318 U.S. 141 (1943).
138 Id. at 143.
139 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (requiring federally licensed radio stations to broadcast opposing
editorial viewpoints).
140 Id. at 389-90.
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ketplace concept and the right to receive information apply to a high
school student's challenge of a library book removal. Red Lion de-
fined the scope of those concepts, stating that they protected "the
right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, es-
thetic, moral and other ideas and experiences." 14 1 Thus, if the right
to receive information and the marketplace concept are fully applica-
ble to the high school student, Red Lion directly contradicts Zkan's
holding that it is permissible for school boards to remove books based
on the personal moral and political views of its members.
In so holding, the Seventh Circuit relied primarily on Cag V.
Board of Education. 142 An examination of Cag indicates that this reli-
ance was misplaced insofar as it applied to library book removals. In
Cag', a group of teachers challenged the school board's prohibition of
ten textbooks. The Tenth Circuit upheld the board's decision, "even
though it was a political one influenced by the personal views of the
members."' 43 The court recognized that President's Council and
Minarcini raised similar issues but explicitly refused to extend its
holding to cases of public school library book removals.'44 Further-
more, the court relied heavily on a concurring opinion of Justice
Black in Epperson v. Arkansas, which reasoned that a teacher contrac-
tually agrees to teach what the school board designates and the first
amendment does not justify his breach of that agreement. 45 This
reasoning has no application in a library book removal case. Thus,
Cay is inapplicable to library book removals.
Yet the Zykan opinion so applied it146 and Judge Mansfield's dis-
sent in Pico followed Zkan.'4 7 Judge Mansfield also used James v.
Board of Education 148 as authority for upholding book removals based
on the personal preferences of the board members. InJames, the Sec-
ond Circuit wrote that "a principal function of all . . .secondary
education is indoctrinative whether it be to teach the ABC's or multi-
plication tables or to transmit the basic values of the community.'
49
However, by stating that aprincipal function of the secondary schools
is indoctrinative, the James opinion implies that other functions exist
141 395 U.S. at 390.
142 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979).
143 Id. at 544.
144 Id. at 542.
145 Id. at 540 (quoting 393 U.S. at 113-14).
146 631 F.2d at 1305.
147 638 F.2d at 426.
148 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1972).
149 638 F.2d at 426 (quoting 461 F.2d at 573).
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which are not indoctrinative and which may be analytic. As has
been illustrated, the school library serves an analytic function.
Therefore,James is not necessarily authority for the validation of li-
brary book removals based on the personal preferences of board
members.
From Red Lion, it can be inferred that a prima facie violation of
the public's right to receive information occurs when suitable access
to varying political, moral, esthetic and social views is restricted.
This standard, however, is too broad to apply to the school setting.
Rather, the school should be classified as a political marketplace of
ideas, giving rise to a right to receive political information. The
Supreme Court first applied the marketplace concept to schools in
order to preserve a national leadership trained through a broad ideo-
logical exposure. 150 This concern with the nation's leadership indi-
cates that the Court intended the schools to be primarily a political
marketplace. Judge Newman, concurring in Pico, also acknowledged
the political marketplace concept, stating:
[P]olitical thought is a particularly important and sensitive area.
Our society depends for its choice of leaders and basic policy deci-
sions on the independent thinking of its citizens, and on the vitality
of the marketplace of ideas. [citation omitted]. . . Education plays
a significant role in preparing students for those responsibilities of
citizenship.'15
Furthermore, many of the right-to-receive-information cases indicate
a political justification for that right.' 52 Case law thus supports the
concept of the school library a.s a political marketplace of ideas.
Practical considerations also support a right to receive political
information in public school libraries. Eighteen-year-olds, seniors in
high school or recent graduates, have the right to vote. Should the
government reinstate the draft, they would be among the first called
to serve. A recent survey indicates that nearly half of the age sixteen
and over population never reads a book. 53 Consequently, school
boards that remove books because they conflict with the personal
political views of board members, effectively deny to many students
150 Kqishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
151 638 F.2d at 435.
152 See generalY Steel, Freedom to Hear: A PoliticalJust6Yfath'on for the First Amendment, 46
WASH. L. REV. 311, 33241 (1971).
153 The 1978 Consumer Research Study on Reading and Book Purchasing: A Study In-
quiring into the Nature of Reading and Book Buying Habits of the American Public, con-
ducted for the Book Industry Study Group by Yankelovich, Skelly and White, Inc. (October
1978).
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an exposure to alternative political viewpoints. These same students
are then called to elect and to serve a government of which they may
be woefully uninformed.
Thus, both precedent and policy support the doctrine that a
prima facie first amendment violation occurs when a school board
removes a high school library book based upon the personal political
views of the board members. Removal of materials dealing with
public figures, public issues or other important social matters 54 indi-
cates that the removal was politically motivated.
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the school board
should have defenses to assert. Procunier v. Martinez 55 sets out the
standard for defenses to violations of the right to receive information.
In Procunier, the Supreme Court held that censorship of prisoners'
outgoing mail violated the addressees' first amendment right to re-
ceive information.156 The Court then held that such a violation was
justified only if the prison officials met two criteria. First, the censor-
ship had to further "an important or substantial government interest
unreleated to the suppression of expression." Second, the restriction
had to be "no greater than [was] necessary or essential to the protec-
tion of the particular governmental interest involved."'1
57
The Procunier criteria should apply equally to a school board's
removal of library books in violation of the students' right to receive
political information. Examples of legitimate and substantial gov-
ernmental interests include a book's obsolescence, protection of the
psychological well-being of the students, 58 preservation of school dis-
cipline' 59 and vulgarity or indecency.160 Under the approach which
this note suggests, board members could constitutionally apply their
individual tastes and preferences in determining what is vulgar and
indecent.
Finally, once the school board has asserted a valid defense the
students should have an opportunity to show that the purportedly
valid reason for the removal is actually a pretext for the assertion of
personal political views.
154 Steel, supra note 152, at 341.
155 416 U.S. 396 (1973).
156 Id. at 409.
157 Id. at 413. Accord, Pico, 638 F.2d at 415. (Sifton, J.). Judge Sifton does not use
Procunier as authority, probably because he does not rely on the right to receive information.
158 Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512,517 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978).
159 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
160 Thomas v. Board of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1081 (1980) (Newman, J., concurring).
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C. Suggested Means of Proof
Students have several available means by which to prove that a
school board's removal of a library book was based on the personal
political views of its members. First, the act of removal itself is strong
evidence that the board members are exercising personal values or
preferences. 61 If the banned material concerns public figures, public
issues or other important social matters 62 and the board has not ex-
plained its reasons for the removal, a rebuttable presumption should
arise that the school board based the removal on its members' per-
sonal political preferences. This presumption would abrogate the
students' difficult task of proving the board's motive and encourage
school boards to explain their actions. 63 Any school board depar-
ture from established book removal procedures also evidences- an im-
permissible removal, especially when those procedures provide for
non-board input.'6 Similarly, the lack of an established procedure
requiring non-board input into book removal decisions is evidence
the personal preferences motivated board decisions. These means of
proof encourage local school boards to implement and follow book
removal procedures that allow for input from parents, teachers, stu-
dents and administrators.
Similar means of proof are available to defendant school boards
in book removal cases. Steps short of removal, such as making the
book available on direct loan to parents, indicate that the board's
motive is not assertion of personal political preferences, but protec-
tion of students' well-being. Procedures allowing for non-board in-
put into removal decisions are, likewise, proof that the board is not
asserting personal preferences. Finally, board explanations concur-
rent with the removal, which authorize discussion of the book's polit-
ical ideas and enumerate the legitimate reasons for the removal,
161 See P'co, 638 F.2d at 434 (Newman J. concurring).
162 Steel, supra note 152, at 341.
163 "The dangers of unrestrained discretion are readily apparent.... By requiring the
Board.. . to justify its actions when there is a colorable claim of deprivation of first amend-
ment rights, we establish a prophylactic procedure that automatically tempers the abuse of a
properly vested right." James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d at 575.
164 In Salvail, the board voted not to follow interim book removal guidelines providing for
input from library personnel, administrators and teachers. 469 F. Supp. at 1271. In Z ,
the board disregarded the "Croft policy," 631 F.2d at 1302, which required teacher, adminis-
trator and lay input. Brief for Appellants at 3. In Pico a committee of school staff members
and parents reviewed the books and made recommendations which the board ignored. 638
F.2d at 410-11. In Bicknell, the board declined to follow a procedure requiring parental input.
638 F.2d at 440-41.
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demonstrate that the board's reasons are valid and not mere pretexts
for the assertion of personal political preferences.
Students could prove pretext by showing that the board did not
remove books which it knew contained material similar to that legiti-
mately objected to in the removed books 65 or by showing that the
board formulated and advanced constitutionally valid explanations
for the removal only after students challenged the removal in
court. 166
III. Conclusion
No single test has been established for determining when re-
moval of a book from a public school library violates the first amend-
ment. Rather, a spectrum of standards exist which vary from circuit
to circuit and even within the Second Circuit. A balance is needed
between the students' first amendment rights and the community's
right, through its school board, to regulate the books its children
read. In striking that balance, the suggested approach encourages
open, rational decision-making, discourages arbitrary abuse of discre-
tion and adds a measure of certainty to an unstable area of first
amendment law.
Richard Ricci
165 See Salvai/, 469 F. Supp. at 1274.
166 See Right to Read, 454 F. Supp. at 712.
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